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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This research is intended to develop better understanding of economic shock transmission 
process from one country to another. As the world has become increasingly integrated in recent 
years, the shock originated in one country has direct and dramatic impact on other countries. 
This has been observed recently when we passed through a terrible economic crisis that indeed 
originated in the U.S. but spread all over the world leading to a severe contraction in output and 
hardship for millions of people around the globe. This situation, in fact, led us to ponder over 
how the economic landscapes of other countries are affected when economically integrated 
another country is hit by a shock. We investigate this question by estimating a vector 
autoregression (VAR) model and identify the U.S. real, nominal, and financial shocks and 
observe their effects on the U.S. as well as on the G-7 macroeconomic variables.  
In the following chapter, we examine the international transmission effects of first two 
economic shocks - real and nominal shocks. A classical work on investigating the transmission 
effects of such shocks is found in famous Mundell-Fleming model, which predicts that an 
increase in foreign interest rates as a result of monetary tightening abroad under fixed exchange 
rate regime would result in output reduction both at home and abroad. The increase in foreign 
interest rates as a result of expansionary government spending, however, would result in the 
expansion of foreign output but a reduction in domestic output. Under flexible exchange rate 
system, there would be an expansion of domestic output and a contraction in foreign output after 
monetary contraction abroad but expansion in output both at home and abroad following 
expansion in government spending abroad. The recently emerged New Open Economy 
Macroeconomics (NOEM) models predict different transmission effects than the Mundell-
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Fleming model1. The Redux model, one of the classical works in this group of literature and 
developed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), predicts that the monetary shocks in the domestic 
country raise the level of domestic output but shows an ambiguous effect on foreign output. 
Exchange rate overshooting, one of the pioneering predictions of the Dornbusch’s (1976) 
dynamic Mundell-Fleming model, is, however, absent in this model.  
To investigate further the transmission effects of real and nominal shocks, we develop a 
theoretical rational expectation open economy macroeconomic model, and this mode’s long-run 
implications are used to identify monetary and real shocks in the U.S.. While the identification 
technique as pioneered by Blanchard and Quah (1989) is applied to exploit long-run implications 
of the model, appropriate sign restrictions as implied by the model’s short-run dynamics are also 
exploited (into the contemporaneous coefficient matrix of the VAR model) to account for the 
short-run implications of the model. The effects of identified shocks on output, exchange rates, 
and inflation are observed for U.S. relative to each of six other G-7 countries. The theoretical 
model draws primarily on the open economy macro model developed by Obstfeld (1985), while 
other ingredients of the model are also extracted from Mundell (1963), Fleming (1962) and 
Dornbusch (1976)2.  
The empirical results show that there is a positive and persistent increase of U.S. real GDP 
relative to other countries’ real GDP, and a depreciation of U.S. currency relative to other 
currencies following a supply shock in the U.S.. While the results with output and exchange rates 
are consistent with the predictions of the model, the response of relative price of home-produced 
                                                          
1
 A detailed survey on the evolution and foundation of NOEM is found in Lane (2001).  Imperfect competition, be it 
in product and/or factor markets, in general equilibrium setup is a key ingredient of the models in NOEM. These 
models aim to overcome the limitations of Mundell-Fleming model and emphasize international dimension of 
optimal monetary policy and desirability of international monetary policy cooperation. A far from complete list for 
further references includes Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), and Woodford (2007). 
2
 For introducing nominal rigidity, we rely on a very simple price setting equation as pioneered by Flood (1981) and 
Mussa (1982), in which price adjustment is completed within one period.  
3 
 
 
 
goods to the price of foreign-produced goods after a supply shock does not confirm with the 
model’s predictions. As with demand and monetary shocks, the response of relative real GDP is 
mostly in line with the model’s predictions, whereas real and nominal effective exchange rates 
do not response as expected in the model following demand and monetary shocks. The variance 
decompositions show that relative real GDP is largely governed by supply shocks whereas 
demand shocks causes most of the variations in real effective exchange rates. Monetary shocks 
lead to a substantial variation in price differential between the countries. Most notable result of 
this study is the existence of exchange rate overshooting following a supply shock.  
Chapter 3 investigates the transmission effects of U.S. financial shocks on the U.S. and 
other G-7 macroeconomic variables. Past studies have already justified the association between 
financial and real sector. The nature of link is procyclical where  financial crisis leads to a 
contraction in real activities (Borio (2007), Goodhart (1996), and Minsky (1992)). Bernanke and 
Gertler (1995) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) propose a model in which financial 
accelerator plays a significant role that reinforces the effects of financial cycles on the real 
economy by changing the values of collateral that ultimately affect the willingness of the 
financial system to make available of the credit.  
In analyzing the potential link between financial and real sector, we at the beginning 
closely observe the behavior of stock prices and federal funds rate in the U.S. for a daily data 
starting from 1957. This basic specification is then extended to observe the effects of U.S. 
financial shocks to other U.S. and international macroeconomic variables by estimating recursive 
vector autoregression. The identification strategy we apply in this study for the VAR estimation 
is similar to Sims (1980) and Kim (2001).  
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The results show that the financial shocks in the stock market has no any definite effect on 
the behavior of federal funds rate, which is customary believe that Federal Reserve does not 
respond to stock market volatility in the very short-run. The effect of monetary policy shocks, 
however, exerts a negative effect on stock prices, and the effects die out after 10 days. Other U.S. 
macroeconomic variables also exhibit expected responses following the shocks on the U.S. 
financial system. The positive innovation to U.S. financial stress index (FSI), for example, has 
negative impact on U.S. real GDP and industrial production. The difference between asset and 
liabilities, which can be defined as capital requirements, on the other hand, also respond 
negatively to financial shocks, which support the evidence that banks face dire capital crunch 
following the crisis. The international transmission effect of U.S. financial shocks is also in line 
with the expectation, leading to a decline in the real GDP in the rest of G-7 countries following a 
financial stress in the US. This shock also leads to a decline in the interest rates in all other 
countries, showing that other countries follow the U.S. policy of reducing interest rates after 
crisis happens in the U.S.. The stock prices decline in other countries as well when the U.S. 
economy is hit by financial shocks.  
We conclude the findings of this research in Chapter 4. Our conclusion is that all three 
shocks real, nominal and financial shocks have significant and direct impact on macroeconomic 
variables of G-7 countries. This mandates for appropriate policy responses to be adopted by 
these countries to address the transmission effects in the region. This chapter also provides an 
account of possible areas that this research can be extended to in the future. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INTERNATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF U.S. REAL AND NOMINAL SHOCKS 
1. Introduction 
This study examines the international transmission of U.S. real and nominal shocks on key 
macroeconomic variables of G-7 countries. We develop a theoretical rational expectation open 
economy macroeconomic model, and this mode’s long-run implications are used to identify 
monetary and real shocks. While the identification technique as pioneered by Blanchard and 
Quah (1989) is applied to exploit long-run implications of the model, appropriate sign 
restrictions as implied by the model’s short-run dynamics are also exploited (into the 
contemporaneous coefficient matrix of the VAR model) to account for the short-run implications 
of the model. The effects of identified shocks on output, exchange rates, and inflation are 
observed for U.S. relative to each of six other G-7 countries. The theoretical model draws 
primarily on the open economy macro model developed by Obstfeld (1985), while other 
ingredients of the model are also extracted from Mundell (1963), Fleming (1962) and Dornbusch 
(1976)3.  
 Transmission effects of shocks beyond international borders have been experimented in 
many theoretical and empirical works with varied range of predictions. The famous Mundell-
Fleming model, for example, predicts that an increase in foreign interest rates as a result of 
monetary tightening abroad under fixed exchange rate regime would result in output reduction 
both at home and abroad. The increase in foreign interest rates as a result of expansionary 
government spending, however, would result in the expansion of foreign output but a reduction 
                                                          
3
 For introducing nominal rigidity, we rely on a very simple price setting equation as pioneered by Flood (1981) and 
Mussa (1982), in which price adjustment is completed within one period.  
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in domestic output. The effects of monetary and real shocks are rather different under flexible 
exchange rate system, leading to an expansion of domestic output and a contraction in foreign 
output after monetary contraction abroad but expansion in output both at home and abroad 
following expansion in government spending abroad. The models in New Open Economy 
Macroeconomics (NOEM) literature suggest different transmission effects than the Mundell-
Fleming model. A seminal work of NOEM, the Redux model, developed by Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1995) predicts that the domestic monetary shocks raise the level of domestic output but shows 
an ambiguous effect on foreign output. An interesting result of this model is the lack of exchange 
rate overshooting, which is in contrary to the prediction of Dornbusch’s (1976) dynamic 
Mundell-Fleming model. The exchange rate overshooting is, however, restored in Betts and 
Devereux’s (2000a) model, which assumes incomplete exchange rate pass-through as opposed to 
complete exchange rate pass-through in Redux model4.   
Within the premises of such diversified theoretical predictions, this study provides a fresh 
account of international transmission effects of U.S. real and nominal shocks in rest of G-7 
countries by estimating a structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model. Earlier applications 
of VAR analysis in open economy macroeconomics are found in Clarida and Gali (1994) and 
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995). Clarida and Gali (1994) identify sources of real exchange rate 
fluctuations for post-Bretton Woods period for U.S., Japan, Germany, and Canada. The 
estimation of structural VAR in their study produces consistent results with the predictions of the 
Mundell-Fleming model showing that demand shocks lead to appreciation and monetary shocks 
lead to depreciation of the home currency. Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) also find the results 
                                                          
4
 A detailed analysis of transmission of shocks in incomplete exchange rate pass-through is found in Corsetti and 
Pesenti (2007).  The authors in this paper demonstrate the shock transmission process in three different sorts of 
incomplete exchange rate pass-through: local currency pricing (LCP), producer currency pricing (PCP), and dollar 
pricing (DP). In all these settings, the shocks are transmitted differently. Transmission effects are different for these 
three settings. 
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similar to Clarida and Gali (1994). Kim (2001), on the other hand, estimates structural VAR to 
identify unidirectional effect of the US monetary policy shocks to the macroeconomic variables 
of G-7 countries and finds that the U.S. monetary expansion has a positive spillover effects on 
real GDP and industrial production of non-U.S. G-6 countries. Kim’s results, however, do not 
seem to be consistent with the predictions of Mundell-Fleming and sticky price NOEM models.  
Despite the prevalence of growing literatures that use VAR in explaining transmission 
effects of economic shocks, earlier studies were primarily designed for closed economy, and, if 
at all extended for open economy, the extensions were basically designed to explain exchange 
rate fluctuations. This study, however, provides a most recent contribution to explain the effects 
of shocks also on output and prices. As a prima facie attempt, we also notably include in our 
estimation the short-run implications of the model into the VAR estimation, which lacks in the 
earlier studies.  
The empirical results show that there is a positive and persistent increase of U.S. real GDP 
relative to other countries’ real GDP, and a depreciation of U.S. currency relative to other 
currencies following a supply shock. While the results with output and exchange rates are 
consistent with the predictions of the model, the response of relative price of home-produced 
goods to the price of foreign-produced goods after a supply shock does not confirm with the 
model’s predictions. As with demand and monetary shocks, the response of relative real GDP is 
mostly in line with the model’s predictions, whereas real and nominal effective exchange rates 
do not response as expected in the model following demand and monetary shocks. The variance 
decompositions show that relative real GDP is largely governed by supply shocks whereas 
demand shocks causes most of the variations in real/nominal effective exchange rates. Monetary 
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shocks lead to a substantial variation in price differential between the countries. Most notable 
result of this study is the existence of exchange rate overshooting following a supply shock.  
Rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the theoretical model. 
Section 3 provides an account of empirical strategy. Results are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Model Framework 
Mondell-Fleming model is extensively-used model in policy-related research by central 
banks for over four decades, and the model derived here is similar to this model but extended as 
stochastic Mondell-Fleming model as pioneered by Obstfeld (1985). Following Clarida and Gali 
(1994), all variables used are U.S. relative to foreign country, which essentially makes this model 
as a two-country model. Foreign interest rates are set to zero without loss of generality. All 
variables except interest rates are in log.  
The demand side of the economy is represented by the following IS equation  
tdtptptEtitpts
d
ty +−+−−−= ))1(()( φϕ                                           (1) 
where dt is aggregate demand shock, and )1( tptptEti −+−  is an ex ante real interest rate. 
Provided that ϕ  and φ  are positive, real exchange rate (st – pt) and demand shocks have positive 
effects on aggregate demand whereas real interest rates have negative effect.  
The LM equation is given by 
ti
d
tytp
s
tm κ−=−                                                                              (2) 
where 0>κ and income elasticity of money demand is assumed to be unity.  
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Nominal rigidity is introduced in the following price-setting equation 
)1(1 tptEtptptEtp
(((
−−+−= θ                                                                          (3) 
where p(  is a shadow value of flexible price equilibrium. If 1=θ , prices are instantaneously 
perfectly flexible, and if 0=θ  they are completely fixed one period in advance. 10 << θ  
demonstrate intermediate degrees of price rigidity.  
The following uncovered interest parity equation demonstrates the capital market equilibrium 
)1( tststEti −+=                                                                                            (4) 
The shock processes are captured by the following three equations: 
t
s
ty
s
ty ω+−= 1                                                                                     (5) 
11 −−+−= tttdtd τµµ                                                            (6) 
ttmtm ξ+−= 1                                                                                     (7) 
The supply shocks and monetary shocks are assumed to be pure random walks (equations 
(5) and (7)). The demand shocks also exhibit random walks; however, following Clarida and 
Gali (1994) a portion of the shocks are assumed to be reverting in the next period as 
demonstrated by the last term in equation (6). The introduction of this term in the demand shock 
process has implication for the application of Blanchard and Quah (1989) technique to estimate 
structural VAR model described in Section 3.  
Flexible price solution )1( =θ 5 
                                                          
5
 The flexible price solution is, in fact, a hypothetical solution, because we cannot characterize steady state in 
stochastic environment as economy is constantly hit by shocks. We therefore prefer to term this solution as shadow 
flexible price solution.  
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Solution for real exchange rates: 
Set dty
s
ty = , assume real exchange rate tptstq −=
(
, and substitute interest parity equation (4) 
into IS equation to get different equation for real exchange rates as 
1++
+
+
−
= tqtE
td
s
ty
tq
((
φϕ
φ
φϕ
 
Using method of undetermined coefficients gives the solution for real exchange rates as  
t
td
s
ty
tq µ
φϕ
φ
ϕ
τ
ϕ






+
+
−
=
(
                                                                 (8) 
Equation (8) demonstrates that real exchange rate is affected only by real and demand shocks but 
not by monetary shocks. 
Solution for Price: 
Substitute (4) into (2) to get 
)1( tststE
s
ty
s
tmtp −++−= κ
(
 
Add p(κ  in both sides, add and subtract 1+tptE
(κ  in the right hand side, apply definition of real 
exchange rates tptstq −=
(
,  and arrange the terms to get 
1)1()1( ++−++−=+ tptEtqtqtEtytmtp
(((( κκκ                                       (9) 
From solution of real exchange rates in equation (8) and also using the shock processes, we 
obtain 
ttqtqtE µφϕ
κ






+
=−+ )1(
((
                                           (10) 
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Substitute this in equation (9) to obtain a stochastic difference equation for price as 
11)1)((1 ++
+
++
+
+
−
= tptEt
tytm
tp
((
κ
κ
µ
κφϕ
τκ
κ
 
Using method of undetermined coefficients we obtain the solution for tp
(
 as 
ttytmtp βµ+−=
(
                                                  (11) 
where 
))(1( φϕκ
κτ
β
++
=  
Prices are affected by all three shocks in flexible price equilibrium as observed in equation (11).  
Sticky price solution )10( << θ : 
Solution for price: 
Substitute price solution equation (11) into price setting equation (3) to get 
))(1( ttttptp βµωξθ +−−−=
(
                                        (12) 
where tp
(
 is flexible price solution. 
As can be seen in equation (12), the deviation of price from long-run equilibrium is negatively 
affected by demand and monetary shocks and positively by supply shocks.  
Solution for real exchange rate: 
Substitute (12) and (1) into (2) to obtain 
)1()1)((])[1( tptptEtqtqtEtqtdttttptm −+−−++−+=+−−+− κφφϕβµωξθ
(
               (13) 
 Substitute (11) into (12) and get the expression for )1( tptptE −+  as  
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])[1()1( tttttptptE βµωξθβµ +−−+−=−+                                                    (14) 
Substitute (14) and (10) into (11) to obtain stochastic difference equation for qt as  
1)()1())(1)(1()( ++++−−+−+−=++ tqtEttttdtytq κφβµκθωξκθκφϕ  
Using method of undetermined coefficients gives the solution for qt as  
)()1)(1(
)(
)1()(
tttd
tdty
tq ωξ
κφϕ
κθ
κφϕϕ
κβϕθκφτ
ϕ
−
++
+−
+
++
+−+
+
−
=  
Using (8) we can also have the solution for qt as  
][)1)(1( ttttqtq βµωξκφϕ
θκ
+−
++
−+
+=
(
                                       (15) 
For the solution of nominal exchange rates, qt and pt are substituted in the expression for nominal 
exchange rates st = qt + pt to obtain 
][)1()1( ttttsts βµωξκφϕ
θ
φϕ +−
++
−
−−+=
(
                                                             (16) 
The solution for nominal exchange rates show that the deviation of real and nominal 
exchange rates from long-run equilibrium is positively affected by demand and monetary shocks 
and negatively by supply shocks, given 0)( <− φϕ . This shows that supply shocks can produce 
exchange rate overshooting, and this implication is tested empirically by estimating a VAR in 
Section 4.   
Solution for aggregate demand:  
By using (4) we can write IS equation as 
tdtqtEtq
d
ty ++∆−= ))1(φϕ                                                     (17) 
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Forwarding one period ahead, using (10) and taking expectation for (15) to get 
][)1)(1()
1
(
ttttt
q
t
E βµωξ
κφϕ
θκ
µ
φϕ
τ
+−
++
−+
−
+
=
+
∆                                            (18) 
Substituting (17) and (15) into (16) to obtain the solution for aggregate demand as 
][))(1)(1( ttttydty βµωξκφϕ
φϕθκ
+−
++
+−+
+=                                                     (19) 
This equation exhibits that the deviation of real GDP from long-run equilibrium is positively 
affected by demand and monetary shocks and negatively by supply shocks, given 0)( <− φϕ .  
In the short-run all variables are affected by all three shocks contemporaneously as shown 
by equations (12), (15), (16), and (18) but in the long-run the system becomes triangular as 
output is affected only by supply shocks (equation (5)), real exchange rates by supply and 
demand shocks (equation (8)), and price by all three demand, supply and monetary shocks 
(equation (11)). Both these long-run and short-run implications of the model are used in 
estimating structural VAR model described in the next section.  
3. Empirical Strategy 
3.1 Structural VAR Model  
A two-country world is described by a following structural equation 
tetyLtBy +Γ= )(                                                                 (20) 
where B is a contemporaneous coefficient matrix in structural equations, yt is 13×  data vector 
which includes U.S. relative output, relative real/nominal effective exchange rates, and relative 
prices. te  is a 13× vector of structural shocks - aggregate supply shocks, aggregate demand 
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shocks, and monetary shocks. te  are assumed to be serially uncorrelated with Var( te ) = Σ  as a 
diagonal matrix with unit variances of structural disturbances on the principal diagonal.  
The VAR is estimated in the reduced-form equation as 
tutyLty +Φ= )(                                                                                (21) 
where )(1)( LBL Γ−=Φ , teBtu 1−= ,  and Ω=)( tuVar .  
Using the relationship teBtu
1−=  and the assumption of  I=Σ  gives Ω  as 
 
′−−=Ω 11BB                                                                                             (22) 
Reduced-from model, which downsizes the structural representation of the system, leads to 
identification problem. To recover the parameters of structural equations and the innovations 
thereto, we must impose restrictions on the structural system. There are two ways to restrict the 
system: first, the short-run restrictions employ both recursive (Sims (1980)), and non-recursive 
frameworks (Bernanke (1986), Sims(1986)) in the matrix B and the second, the long-run 
restrictions employ restriction on long-run multipliers. The identification strategy we apply here 
is long-run restrictions as suggested by Blanchard and Quah (1989). To apply this approach, the 
equations (19) and (20) are represented in the moving average form as 
teLty )(Θ=                                                                                       (23) 
tuLty )(Ψ=                                                                                       (24) 
From equations (23) and (24), the relationship between the structural and reduced-form 
parameters becomes 
1)1()1( −Ψ=Θ B                                                                        (25) 
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The matrix )1(Ψ  is obtained by using reduced-form estimated parameters s'ˆΦ  from equation 
(21), and B-1 is estimated by using maximum likelihood estimation6.  The long-run restrictions 
are applied in the matrix )1(Θ  to recover B-1. The restrictions come from long-run implication of 
the model described in Section 2. That the model demonstrates that output is not affected by 
demand and monetary shocks and real exchange rate is not affected by monetary shocks makes 
the matrix of long-run multipliers )1(Θ a lower triangular matrix. This lower triangular condition 
helps identify matrix B-1, and thereby )(LΘ , and finally the impulse responses and variance 
decompositions.  
In order to exploit the short-run implications of the model, we use the relationship
teBtu
1−= , in which appropriate sign restrictions are imposed on the matrix B-1 so that the 
contemporaneous effects of the innovations are accordingly transmitted to the reduced-from 
disturbances and thereby to variables used in the model. The model’s short-run dynamics implies 
that the supply shocks have negative adjustment process (that is, the difference between long-run 
equilibrium values and short-run sticky price values) for relative GDP and real effective 
exchange rates and positive for relative prices, whereas demand and monetary shocks have 
positive adjustment process for relative real GDP and relative real effective exchange rates but 
negative for real/nominal effective exchange rates (equations 12, 15, and 19). To incorporate this  
short-run characteristics of the model into the VAR estimation, we convert B-1 matrix into a new 
matrix, say C-1 ,  such that C-1=MB-1N where  m11=1, m22 = 1 and m33 = -1, and n11=-1, n22=1 and 
                                                          
6
 To obtain )1(Ψ , the equation (20) is first represented in state-space form for Wold representation where the 
reduced-form estimated parameters s'ˆΦ  from equation (21) are used which provide us a 33×  matrix )1(Ψ .  The 
details on how to estimate )1(Ψ is in gauss codes, which can be made available upon request. Unlike in Clarida and 
Gali (1994), we estimate B-1 by using maximum likelihood estimation. The likelihood function for this estimation is:  
Ω, Π  	
  log2  


 log|Ω
| 	 1/2∑ ̂ Ω̂!    where, Ω  ""# 
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n33=1.  With this specification, an important issue arises here and needs to be addressed. The 
results must be interpreted in growth rates. The shocks have effects only on the deviations of the 
variables from the long-run equilibrium in the short-run sticky price solution. As implied by the 
price setting rule, it is assumed that the long-run value is attained in the next period, thus the first 
difference can best be represented as short-run deviations of the variables from the long-run, 
which we do to obtain empirical results in VAR estimation.  
3.2 Data 
The international financial statistics (IFS) published by International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
is a major source of data for this study. As suggested by previous researchers, this is a rich 
source of data for open economy macro analysis, and the data in this source is available for large 
number of cross-sections ranging for many years. The study is confined only to G-7 countries 
(United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan). This confinement 
is relevant in the sense that these countries have closer economic ties, and the shocks generated 
in any of these countries will have direct impact on the economies of other countries. For the 
estimation, we use quarterly data ranging from 1980Q1 to 2009Q2. The variables used are: real 
GDP, real effective exchange rates and GDP deflator. Since the quarterly flows of real GDP for 
U.S., CAN, JAP are not available in the IFS, they are obtained from OECD to generate 
consistent real GDP series for all countries. For exchange rates, we use effective exchange rates 
in place of ordinary exchange rates between two countries. Effective exchange rates are obtained 
by suitably weighing the exchange rate index for the country itself and the index of 20 other 
industrial countries. The justification for using such rates comes from the fact that our sample 
includes major industrial countries and such rates truly reflect the exchange rate behavior in 
these countries.  
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4. Empirical Results 
This section summarizes the results obtained from estimating structural VAR model 
described in Section 3.  The variables used for this estimation are: log of relative real gross 
domestic product (RGDP), the log of relative real effective exchange rates (REER/NEER), and 
the log of relative GDP deflator (DEF), of the U.S. to foreign country. Since all these variables 
demonstrate unit roots (Table 1), the VAR uses their first differences.  The lag length in the unit 
root tests are determined by Ng and Perron (1995)’s approach, which supports for 4 lags7. The 
first differences transform the variables used in the VAR specification as output growth rate 
differential, real effective exchange rates differential, and inflation differential.  
Table 1. Unit Root Tests# 
Variables (first 
difference) 
Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) Test Statistics 
US/CAN US/FRA US/GER US/ITA US/JAP US/UK 
loggdp -2.61 -3.95 -3.73 -3.72 -3.49 -3.95 
logreer -2.73 -3.76 -4.13 -3.78 -4.01 -3.82 
logprice -2.93 -1.85 -2.62 -2.16 -4.07 -3.14 
#Tests were conducted in the specification with intercepts with 4 lags  
Critical values for 1%, 5%, and 10% are, respectively, -3.49, -2.89, and -2.58. 
 
Before explaining the impulse responses and variance decompositions, we first summarize 
the expected dynamics of the variables to supply, demand and monetary shocks as implied in our 
model.  
                                                          
7
 According to this approach, we set an upper bound for p, say pmax, and estimate the ADF test regression with this 
upper bound. As suggested by Schwert (1989), the pmax is obtained by using the formula pmax=[12.(T/100)1/4] where 
T is the number of observations. When the absolute value of the t-statistic for testing the significance of the last 
lagged difference turns significant (as a rule of thumb greater than 1.6), p is set to be pmax, otherwise the lag length 
is reduced by one by one and perform this repeatedly until we have t-statistic for testing the significance of the last 
lagged difference becomes significant. In our test, for example, Schewert’s criteria sets pmax as 12. t-values for the 
last term in ADF test for loggdp US/CAN starting from maximum 12 lags are, respectively, .09, 1.23,-0.79,-0.84,-
0.17,1.41,-0.63,-1.47,1.62, which supported for 4 lags.  
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Table 2. Responses of relative RGDP, REER and DEF to Supply, Demand and Monetary Shocks 
as Suggested by the Model and Empirical Results 
Shocks 
RGDP REER DEF 
Model Actual Model Actual Model Actual 
Supply 
(Real) Positive Confirmed Positive  Confirmed Negative 
Contradicted (except for 
US/FRA) 
Demand 
(Nominal) Positive Contradicted Negative  Contradicted Positive 
Contradicted (except for 
US/FRA and US/CAN) 
Monetary 
(Nominal)  Positive  
Confirmed 
(except for 
US/ITA) 
Positive  
Contradicted 
(except 
US/UK and 
US/FRA) 
Positive Confirmed 
 
As shown in Table 2, the model described in the previous section predicts that the response 
of relative output in response to all three shocks is positive. The relative real effective exchange 
rates, on the other hand, depreciate in response to supply and monetary shocks but appreciate in 
response to demand shocks. The relative prices are observed positive in response to demand and 
monetary shocks but negative in response to supply shocks. 
The impulse responses of relative U.S. real GDP, REER, and price levels to all shocks are 
reported in Figure 1.  
The impulse responses of relative real GDP to supply shocks is mostly consistent with the 
predictions of the model.  The impulse responses demonstrate that there is a positive response of 
home country’s real GDP relative to foreign country’s to supply shocks, which is valid for all 
country pairs. The one standard deviation of a supply shock, for example for the U.S./U.K pair, 
produces 5.0 percent increase in the U.S. real GDP relative to the U.K.’s real GDP at the 
19 
 
 
 
beginning quarter and then the effect dies out. The relative real GDP exhibits persistence 
following real shocks whereas it exhibits hump-shaped in response to monetary shocks.  
Figure 1. Impulse responses 
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Figure 1 (continued) 
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Figure 1 (continued) 
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The response of relative real effective exchange rates to supply shocks is also consistent 
with the model’s predictions. The relative real effective exchange rates depreciate for all country 
pairs when there is a positive supply shock, a similar result as found in Stockman (1987) and 
Huizinga (1987). The supply shock effects on real exchange rates continues to depreciate for all 
time horizons, which is attributable to our identification strategy in which supply shocks have 
long-run effects on the real exchange rates. In response to demand shocks, however, the relative 
real exchange rates do not appreciate as contrary to what has been suggested by the model. This 
can be justified with an argument that the demand shock generated in home country resulted in 
higher import demand leading to home country’s currency depreciation. This is convincingly 
possible for the open economies such as those included in our sample. The effect of demand 
shocks on relative real effective exchange rates contradicts with the model’s prediction. The 
effect of monetary shocks to the real exchange rates is conformable to the model’s prediction 
only for U.S./U.K. and U.S./France pairs, resulting in a real depreciation of home currency in 
response to the monetary shocks. This result is in contrary to the results as found in Mussa 
(1986).  
The implied negative effect of supply shocks to relative prices as predicted by the model is 
observed only for U.S./France pair. The effect of demand shocks on relative prices leads to 
decrease in home country’s relative price to foreign’s, which contradicts the predictions of the 
model.  The effect of monetary shocks, however, is consistent with the model for all country 
pairs resulting in a rise in the U.S. relative price in response to monetary shocks in the U.S.. All 
shocks have persistent effect on relative price levels as suggested by our long-run characteristics 
of the model.  
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The impulse responses for the U.S. against three countries France, Germany, and Italy 
appear somewhat problematic with regard to their conformability with the model’s predictions. 
The reason can potentially be fact that these three countries are members of euro, and there was a 
regime change in these countries by participating in common euro currency beginning 1999, 
which certainly have effects on macroeconomic adjustment. In order to control the effect of this 
regime change, a dummy of regime change was introduced into the VAR estimation. , and with 
this new specification the impulse responses did not change significantly but the effect of 
monetary shocks to explain relative real effective exchange rates come closer to the model’s 
predictions (Figure 2).  
Figure 2: Impulse Responses (Regime Change) 
 
 
 
-.005
0
.005
.01
-.05
0
.05
.1
-.04
-.02
0
.02
.04
-.05
0
.05
0
.005
.01
.015
-.05
0
.05
.1
-.05
0
.05
-.05
0
.05
-.01
-.005
0
.005
-.1
-.05
0
.05
-.02
0
.02
.04
-.05
0
.05
-.005
0
.005
.01
-.1
-.05
0
.05
0
.02
.04
.06
.08
0
.05
.1
0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30
Monetary Shock Monetary Shock Monetary Shock Monetary Shock
Regime Change Shock Regime Change Shock Regime Change Shock Regime Change Shock
Demand Shock Demand Shock Demand Shock Demand Shock
Real Shock Real Shock Real Shock Real Shock
Price Regime Change Exchange Rates RGDP
Quarters
US_GER
24 
 
 
 
Figure 2(continued) 
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The variance decompositions in Table 3 demonstrate the proportion of movement of three 
variables included in the VAR specification as resulted from three different shocks.   
Table 3. Variance Decompositions 
Qtr. 
RGDP REER Price 
Supply 
Shock 
Demand 
Shock 
Monetary 
Shock 
Supply 
Shock 
Demand 
Shock 
Monetary 
Shock 
Supply 
Shock 
Demand 
Shock 
Monetary 
Shock 
0 0.97 0.03 0.01 0.14 0.85 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.97 
1 0.96 0.03 0.00 0.23 0.76 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.97 
2 0.95 0.03 0.02 0.24 0.75 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.96 
3 0.92 0.05 0.03 0.24 0.75 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.95 
4 0.89 0.07 0.04 0.22 0.76 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.92 
5 0.89 0.08 0.03 0.22 0.76 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.88 
6 0.89 0.08 0.03 0.23 0.76 0.02 0.01 0.15 0.84 
7 0.89 0.08 0.03 0.25 0.73 0.02 0.01 0.19 0.80 
8 0.90 0.07 0.02 0.28 0.71 0.02 0.02 0.22 0.76 
9 0.91 0.07 0.02 0.29 0.69 0.01 0.02 0.24 0.74 
10 0.92 0.07 0.02 0.30 0.69 0.01 0.02 0.25 0.72 
15 0.95 0.04 0.01 0.39 0.61 0.01 0.04 0.26 0.70 
20 0.97 0.03 0.01 0.46 0.54 0.01 0.05 0.25 0.70 
25 0.98 0.02 0.00 0.51 0.48 0.00 0.07 0.25 0.68 
30 0.98 0.01 0.00 0.55 0.45 0.00 0.08 0.26 0.66 
35 0.99 0.01 0.00 0.58 0.42 0.00 0.09 0.26 0.65 
40 0.99 0.01 0.00 0.60 0.39 0.00 0.10 0.26 0.64 
US/CAN Pair 
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Table 3 – Continued 
 
Qtrs. 
RGDP REER Price 
Supply 
Shock 
Demand 
Shock 
Monetar
y Shock 
Supply 
Shock 
Demand 
Shock 
Monetar
y Shock 
Supply 
Shock 
Demand 
Shock 
Monetary 
Shock 
0 0.79 0.20 0.02 0.08 0.92 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.96 
1 0.86 0.13 0.01 0.40 0.57 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.98 
2 0.91 0.09 0.01 0.50 0.47 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.98 
3 0.93 0.06 0.01 0.58 0.40 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.97 
4 0.94 0.05 0.00 0.63 0.35 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.95 
5 0.95 0.04 0.00 0.67 0.31 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.94 
6 0.96 0.03 0.00 0.70 0.28 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.94 
7 0.96 0.03 0.01 0.72 0.26 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.93 
8 0.96 0.03 0.01 0.73 0.25 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.92 
9 0.96 0.02 0.01 0.74 0.24 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.92 
10 0.96 0.02 0.01 0.75 0.23 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.90 
15 0.97 0.02 0.01 0.76 0.21 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.87 
20 0.98 0.01 0.01 0.78 0.20 0.02 0.01 0.14 0.85 
25 0.98 0.01 0.01 0.79 0.19 0.02 0.01 0.15 0.84 
30 0.99 0.01 0.01 0.80 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.83 
35 0.99 0.01 0.00 0.81 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.82 
40 0.99 0.01 0.00 0.81 0.18 0.01 0.02 0.17 0.82 
US/GER Pair 
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Table 3 – Continued 
Qtrs. 
RGDP REER Price 
Supply 
Shock 
Demand 
Shock 
Monetar
y Shock 
Supply 
Shock 
Demand 
Shock 
Monetar
y Shock 
Supply 
Shock 
Demand 
Shock 
Monetary 
Shock 
0 0.97 0.03 0.01 0.63 0.37 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.97 
1 0.96 0.03 0.01 0.80 0.14 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.96 
2 0.96 0.04 0.01 0.84 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.90 
3 0.96 0.03 0.01 0.85 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.15 0.80 
4 0.95 0.05 0.01 0.89 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.22 0.72 
5 0.92 0.06 0.02 0.91 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.24 0.67 
6 0.92 0.06 0.02 0.93 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.26 0.64 
7 0.93 0.06 0.02 0.94 0.04 0.01 0.12 0.26 0.62 
8 0.93 0.06 0.01 0.95 0.04 0.01 0.12 0.27 0.61 
9 0.93 0.05 0.01 0.95 0.04 0.01 0.13 0.28 0.60 
10 0.94 0.05 0.01 0.95 0.04 0.01 0.13 0.29 0.58 
15 0.95 0.03 0.01 0.93 0.06 0.01 0.14 0.31 0.55 
20 0.96 0.03 0.01 0.91 0.08 0.01 0.13 0.31 0.55 
25 0.97 0.03 0.01 0.91 0.09 0.01 0.13 0.32 0.56 
30 0.97 0.02 0.01 0.91 0.09 0.00 0.12 0.32 0.56 
35 0.97 0.02 0.01 0.91 0.08 0.00 0.12 0.32 0.55 
40 0.98 0.02 0.01 0.91 0.09 0.00 0.12 0.32 0.55 
US/FRA Pair 
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Table 3 – Continued 
Qtrs. 
RGDP REER Price 
Supply 
Shock 
Demand 
Shock 
Monetar
y Shock 
Supply 
Shock 
Demand 
Shock 
Monetar
y Shock 
Supply 
Shock 
Demand 
Shock 
Monetary 
Shock 
0 0.80 0.15 0.04 0.08 0.91 0.00 0.15 0.04 0.80 
1 0.87 0.11 0.02 0.39 0.59 0.01 0.23 0.05 0.72 
2 0.91 0.07 0.02 0.49 0.50 0.01 0.26 0.06 0.68 
3 0.93 0.06 0.01 0.56 0.42 0.02 0.25 0.10 0.65 
4 0.94 0.05 0.01 0.64 0.35 0.01 0.26 0.12 0.62 
5 0.94 0.05 0.01 0.69 0.30 0.01 0.26 0.15 0.59 
6 0.94 0.05 0.01 0.73 0.26 0.01 0.25 0.19 0.55 
7 0.95 0.04 0.01 0.75 0.24 0.01 0.24 0.24 0.53 
8 0.95 0.04 0.01 0.77 0.22 0.01 0.22 0.27 0.51 
9 0.95 0.04 0.01 0.78 0.21 0.01 0.21 0.30 0.49 
10 0.95 0.03 0.01 0.79 0.20 0.01 0.19 0.32 0.49 
15 0.96 0.03 0.01 0.82 0.18 0.01 0.12 0.41 0.47 
20 0.97 0.02 0.01 0.83 0.16 0.00 0.08 0.46 0.46 
25 0.97 0.02 0.01 0.84 0.15 0.00 0.06 0.49 0.45 
30 0.98 0.02 0.01 0.85 0.15 0.00 0.05 0.51 0.45 
35 0.98 0.01 0.01 0.85 0.14 0.00 0.04 0.52 0.44 
40 0.98 0.01 0.01 0.86 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.53 0.44 
US/ITA Pair 
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Table 3 – Continued 
Qtrs. 
RGDP REER Price 
Supply 
Shock 
Demand 
Shock 
Monetar
y Shock 
Supply 
Shock 
Demand 
Shock 
Monetar
y Shock 
Supply 
Shock 
Demand 
Shock 
Monetary 
Shock 
0 0.82 0.15 0.03 0.21 0.77 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.96 
1 0.85 0.14 0.02 0.51 0.48 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.96 
2 0.86 0.12 0.01 0.56 0.44 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.94 
3 0.87 0.11 0.02 0.60 0.40 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.91 
4 0.88 0.09 0.02 0.63 0.36 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.88 
5 0.90 0.08 0.02 0.68 0.31 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.85 
6 0.92 0.07 0.02 0.71 0.28 0.01 0.07 0.10 0.83 
7 0.93 0.06 0.01 0.73 0.27 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.82 
8 0.94 0.05 0.01 0.74 0.25 0.01 0.07 0.12 0.81 
9 0.94 0.05 0.01 0.76 0.24 0.01 0.07 0.12 0.81 
10 0.95 0.04 0.01 0.77 0.23 0.00 0.07 0.13 0.80 
15 0.96 0.03 0.01 0.81 0.19 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.81 
20 0.97 0.02 0.01 0.83 0.17 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.81 
25 0.98 0.02 0.00 0.84 0.16 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.81 
30 0.98 0.01 0.00 0.85 0.15 0.00 0.05 0.13 0.81 
35 0.98 0.01 0.00 0.86 0.14 0.00 0.05 0.13 0.81 
40 0.99 0.01 0.00 0.86 0.14 0.00 0.05 0.14 0.81 
US/JAP Pair 
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Table 3 – Continued 
Qtrs. 
RGDP REER Price 
Supply 
Shock 
Demand 
Shock 
Monetary 
Shock 
Supply 
Shock 
Demand 
Shock 
Monetary 
Shock 
Supply 
Shock 
Demand 
Shock 
Monetary 
Shock 
0 0.68 0.18 0.15 0.04 0.95 0.01 0.40 0.03 0.58 
1 0.81 0.11 0.08 0.33 0.65 0.02 0.46 0.04 0.50 
2 0.87 0.08 0.05 0.44 0.54 0.01 0.46 0.04 0.50 
3 0.89 0.07 0.04 0.50 0.49 0.01 0.46 0.07 0.47 
4 0.91 0.05 0.04 0.54 0.44 0.02 0.45 0.07 0.48 
5 0.93 0.04 0.03 0.59 0.39 0.02 0.44 0.07 0.49 
6 0.94 0.04 0.03 0.64 0.35 0.02 0.43 0.06 0.50 
7 0.94 0.03 0.03 0.67 0.31 0.02 0.44 0.06 0.51 
8 0.95 0.03 0.02 0.71 0.28 0.02 0.45 0.05 0.50 
9 0.96 0.02 0.02 0.74 0.25 0.01 0.44 0.05 0.51 
10 0.96 0.02 0.02 0.76 0.23 0.01 0.44 0.05 0.51 
15 0.97 0.01 0.01 0.82 0.17 0.01 0.46 0.04 0.50 
20 0.98 0.01 0.01 0.84 0.15 0.01 0.47 0.03 0.50 
25 0.98 0.01 0.01 0.86 0.14 0.01 0.47 0.03 0.50 
30 0.99 0.01 0.01 0.87 0.13 0.01 0.48 0.03 0.49 
35 0.99 0.01 0.01 0.88 0.12 0.00 0.48 0.03 0.49 
40 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.11 0.00 0.48 0.03 0.49 
US/UK Pair 
The results show that the movement in relative real GDP for all country pairs is mainly 
attributed to the supply shocks. In the first quarter of the relative U.S./Canada GDP, for instance, 
96 percent variation of this output is explained by the supply shocks whereas only three percent 
and one percent variations are explained by demand and monetary shocks, respectively.  
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The effects of demand and monetary shocks almost vanish at the end of the period, and therefore 
all movement in relative real GDP is explained entirely by supply shocks.  
The movement in real effective exchange rates, on the other hand, is mainly governed by 
demand shocks. Except for the U.S./Germany country pair, more than 90 percent of variation in 
exchange rates in all country pairs is attributed to demand shocks.  The monetary shocks do not 
play a major role to cause movement in relative real effective exchange rates.  
Monetary shocks are dominant to explain relative price movement. More than 95 percent 
variation in relative price is attributed to monetary shocks for all country pairs except for 
U.S./Italy and U.S./UK country pairs. The demand shock, however, contributes for the most of 
the variation in later periods for the fluctuations of relative price level.  
The impulse responses after applying sign restrictions from short-run dynamics of the 
model have been reported in Figure 3. The impulse responses demonstrate that output adjustment 
process is negative for all country pairs following supply shocks and vanishes after few quarters. 
The important thing to note here is that the impulse responses display the effects of supply 
shocks on the growth rate differential of real GDP between two countries, which suggests that 
after supply shocks in the domestic economy, the gap in growth rate differential between the 
U.S. and other countries narrows down.  The demand and monetary shocks produces the similar 
convergent effect for real GDP but for most of the country pairs the impulse responses lies on the 
negative territory, which contradicts with the model’s prediction.  
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Figure 3: Impulse responses (with short-run sign restrictions) 
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For inflation rate differential, the supply shocks and monetary shocks caused positive 
adjustment process whereas demand shocks generated negative adjustment process for most of 
the country pairs. This suggests that the inflation in the U.S. remains to be lower than the 
inflation in other countries after supply and monetary shocks in the U.S. economy, and the 
opposite happens when demand shocks hit the U.S. economy. The inflation rates in both 
countries, however, are equalized after few quarters as shown by the convergence of the impulse 
responses at zero level after some quarters.  
The dynamics of relative real effective exchange rates is noteworthy here. The impulse 
responses suggest that in most of the country pairs the appreciation rate in the U.S. from a supply 
shock is smaller than the appreciation rate of the foreign economy, whereas the depreciation rate 
of the U.S. currency is greater than the depreciation rate of the foreign currency, following 
demand and monetary shocks in most of the country pairs. The gap remains to be larger at the 
beginning and comes to the convergence at the latter periods. Following the supply shocks, the 
effective exchange rates temporarily falls below the long-run values as indicated by negative 
impulse responses for exchange rates. This indicates that not only the monetary shocks but also 
real shocks are attributed to generate exchange rate overshooting.  
5. Conclusion 
We study the effects of the U.S. real and nominal shocks on key macroeconomic variables 
in G-7 countries by estimating structural VAR model. The impulse responses of U.S. real GDP 
relative to the rest of other countries to the supply shocks are consistent with the predictions of 
the model, resulting in a rise in U.S.’s real GDP compared to other countries’ following the 
supply shocks in the U.S. The relative real GDP persistently increases in response to supply 
shocks whereas it exhibits hump-shape in response to demand and monetary shocks. 
36 
 
 
 
The responses of effective exchange rates to supply shocks are also consistent with the 
model’s predictions. The relative real effective exchange rates depreciate in all country pairs 
when there is a positive supply shock in the U.S. The supply shock effects on real exchange rates 
remains persistent for a longer period of time. In response to demand shocks, however, the 
exchange rates do not appreciate as contrary to the model’s prediction. The effect of monetary 
shocks to the real exchange rates is conformable to the model’s prediction in most of the country 
pairs resulting in real depreciation of home currency in response to the monetary shocks in the 
U.S.. 
The responses of relative prices in the U.S. relative to the prices in other countries, on the 
other hand, do not show consistent prediction with the model. The expected negative effect of 
supply shocks to relative prices as predicted by the model is observed only for U.S./Canada pair. 
The effect of monetary shocks, however, are consistent with the model for all country pairs 
resulting in a rise in the U.S.’s relative prices in response to monetary shocks in the U.S..  
The variance decompositions show that the movement in relative real GDP for all country 
pairs is mainly attributed to the supply shocks. The movement in real effective exchange rates, 
on the other hand, is mainly governed by demand shocks, whereas monetary shocks are 
dominant to explain relative price movement.  
After applying sign restrictions in disequilibrium dynamics, the gap in growth rate 
differential in real GDP between the U.S. and other countries narrows down following a supply 
shocks in the U.S., but following the demand and monetary shocks the growth rate of real GDP 
in the U.S. economy is higher than the growth rate of real GDP in rest of the countries.  For the 
differential in inflation rates, the domestic inflation falls shorter than the foreign inflation after 
supply shocks in the U.S., and the opposite happens when demand and monetary shocks hit the 
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U.S. economy. The exchange rates demonstrate a noteworthy behavior following the supply 
shocks, resulting in most of the country pairs a smaller appreciation rate in the U.S. than the 
appreciation rate in the foreign economy at the beginning and this effect dyes out after few 
quarters. This suggest that not only monetary and demand shocks cause exchange rate 
overshooting but supply shocks are also attributable for exchange rate overshooting.  
While this study provides fresh account of explaining transmission effects of U.S. real and 
nominal shocks beyond international borders, the study is not free of shortcomings. The effects 
of U.S. shocks on international macroeconomic variables through terms trade and interest rate 
differentials have been ignored in this study. By addressing this issue, a realistic transmission 
mechanism of the effects of shocks from one country to other countries is expected.  
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERNATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF U.S. FINANICAL SHOCKS 
1. Introduction 
The world had recently been passed through a severe economic crisis that led to a severe 
contraction in output and hardship for millions of people around the globe. While there is no 
doubt that  the unfettered expansion of the US housing market was behind the trigger of this 
crisis, the question still unresolved is how a trouble in such a small sector of the economy can 
actually pushed the entire world into such a big chaos.  This question indeed led us to ponder 
over how the financial crisis emerged in the U.S. transmitted its effects all over the U.S. and in 
the entire world. We investigate this question by estimating a vector autoregression (VAR) 
model and identify the U.S. financial shocks and observe their effects on domestic as well as on 
the G-7 macroeconomic variables. In our benchmark estimation, we closely observe the behavior 
of stock prices and federal funds rate for a daily data starting from 1957. This basic specification 
is then extended to observe the effects of U.S. financial shocks to other U.S. and international 
macroeconomic variables. The identification strategy we apply in this study for the VAR 
estimation is similar to Kim (2001).  
The benchmark results show that the financial shocks in the stock market has no any 
definite effect on the behavior of federal funds rate, which is customary believe that Federal 
Reserve does not respond to stock market volatility in the very short-run. The effect of monetary 
policy shocks, however, exerts a negative effect on stock prices, and the effects die out after 10 
days. Other U.S. macroeconomic variables also exhibit expected responses following the shocks 
on the U.S. financial system. The positive innovation to U.S. financial stress index (FSI), for 
example, has negative impact on U.S. real GDP and industrial production. The difference 
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between asset and liabilities, which can be defined as capital requirements, on the other hand, 
also respond negatively with financial shocks, which support the evidence that banks face dire 
capital crunch following the crisis. The international transmission effect of U.S. financial shocks 
is also in line with the expectation, leading to a decline in the real GDP in the rest of G-7 
countries following a financial stress in the US. This shock also leads to a decline in the interest 
rates in all other countries, showing that other countries follow the U.S. policy of reducing 
interest rates after crisis happens in the U.S.. The stock prices decline in other countries as well 
when the U.S. economy is hit by financial shocks.  
Rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the literatures. Section 3  
provides an account of methods used to address the research question posed. Results are 
discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Literatures 
Past studies have shown that the volatility in aggregate economy is tightly linked with the 
volatility in financial sector. The nature of link is procyclical (Borio (2007), Goodhart (1996), 
and Minsky (1992)) resulting in a decline in economic activities when financial crisis hits the 
economy. The economy may often distort when there is an abrupt correction mechanism is 
pursued.  
One of the possible reasons why an economy fluctuates in conjunction with the 
development in financial sector is because of the significant role of financial accelerator which 
reinforces the effects of financial cycles on the real economy by changing the values of collateral 
that ultimately affect the willingness of the financial system to make available of the credit. 
(Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), and Kiyotaki and Moore 
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(1997). The financial shocks, according to this hypothesis, are transmitted their effects into the 
economy by changing the creditworthiness of the borrowers.  
The effect of financial accelerator, however, varies with the characteristics of financial 
system (Rajan and Zingales (2003)). The financial system where the finance is based on the 
principle that the buyers and sellers act independently without having strong relationship 
between them will have more absorbing capacity for any financial stress than the financial 
system where the parties are more dependent and made their transaction based on their 
relationship.   
Other studies focus on the role of changes in lenders’ balance sheets as a mechanism to 
affect the real sector of the economy after financial crisis. According this approach, the crisis 
changes the level of capital in the banking system, which affects the lending ability of banks and 
then the overall aggregate macroeconomic activities are affected (Bernanke and Lown (1991), 
Kashyap and Stein (1995), and Gambacorta and others (2007)). Banks become reluctant and 
unable too, in this situation to extend their loans. 
The transmission effect of financial shocks is not only confined to a single country; it has a 
tremendous cross-border effect as evidenced by the global spillover effect we witnessed recently. 
The past two decades have characterized by a substantial cross-border financial integration 
leading to a smooth transmission of financial shocks from one country to another. When 
accounted for direct wealth effect and indirect expectation-driven effect, shocks that originate in 
a large foreign stock market may have non-trivial effects on other open economies that may go 
up to about 10 to 20% of aggregate output fluctuations (Milani (2010)). Such effects would 
become even larger when valuation channel of external adjustment is taken account of (Obstfeld 
(2004) and Ghironi et al. (2006)). According to this approach, the two-way holdings of foreign 
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assets have substantially increased in recent years due to increased financial integration across 
countries and valuation of such assets changes significantly due to a change in exchange rate and 
asset prices leading to the scope for analyzing the transmission effects of financial shocks to 
other economies through valuation channel of external adjustment. Other studies have taken 
account of international equity trading in which households are allowed to choose a portfolio of 
both home and foreign equities and such a situation lead to the vulnerability of income and profit 
situations of domestic economies when financial shocks occurs even in other economy (Engel 
and Matsumoto (2006)).  
In view of such a tremendous role of financial sector to affect macroeconomic activities, a 
great deal of debate has surfaced recently regarding whether central banks should include stock 
prices in their monetary policy rule so that the financial sector would be appropriately addressed 
in monetary policy-making8. Svensson (2000) claims that exchange rate cannot be directly 
included into the monetary policy rule because output has already been included. Smets and 
Wouters (2002), however, find it worthwhile to include exchange rate in monetary feedback rule 
when economy becomes more open. Rogoff (2004, 2006) make aware of not including exchange 
rate into the rule as it can lead to the possible speculation. Moreover, exchange rates are more 
volatile and thus cannot be a good candidate for fitting it to the policy rule. For the same reason 
including asset prices has also become questionable.  
The role of financial cycles to a change in the path of economic activities is not free of 
controversy, however. The emphasis on the role of assets prices as a predictor of aggregate 
economic activities during 1990s emerged as a result of the disappointment over the failure of 
monetary aggregates to forecast the turbulence during 1970s and 1980s. The relationship 
                                                          
8
 Literatures attempting to address this issue include Svensson (2000), Taylor (2001), Smets and Wouters (2002), 
Rogoff (2004, 2006), Nistico (2005), and Castelnivo and Nistico (2010), among others. 
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between financial sector and real economy has, therefore, been considerably unstable depending 
on when the relationships were attempted to be established and also for what countries. (Stock 
and Watson (1993)).   
Bernanke and Gertler (2001), on the other hand, have a view that central bankers should 
respond to asset prices only when the volatility in asset prices only affect the central banks’ 
inflation forecasting. When inflation targeting is in place for an economy, which is in fact a 
preferred policy regime for most of the central banks at present, it already accounts for asset 
price volatility for the monetary policy implication. When the predictive content of asset prices 
for inflation has been accounted for through inflation targeting, there should be no need of 
additional response of monetary policy to asset price fluctuations.  
The literatures above suggest that there is an unresolved question how financial sector 
vulnerability in one country can affect domestic and international macro economy, and this study 
is an attempt of answering this question.    
3. Methodology 
3.1 The VAR Model 
As being a purely empirical work, this study explores the effects of U.S. financial shocks 
on the U.S. macroeconomic variables as well as on the macroeconomic variables of G-7 
countries by estimating a vector autoregressive (VAR) model.  We follow the approach adopted 
by Kim (2001), according to which we estimate a benchmark VAR for domestic variables at first 
and then add foreign variables one-by-one in other VAR specifications. The model is as follows: 
The economy is described by a following structural equation 
K(L)xt = et                                                                                                                                      (1) 
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where xt is 1×n  data vector which includes the variables described below and K(L) a matrix 
polynomial in lag operator L.  et is a 1×n vector of structural innovations where Var(et) = Ω . Ω  
is a diagonal matrix with variances of structural innovations on the diagonal. 
The following reduced-form model is estimated 
xt = Q(L)xt-1 + ut                            (2) 
where K(L) is a matrix polynomial in lag operator L and ∑=)( tuVar . 
Assuming that B be the contemporaneous coefficient matrix and K0(L) be the coefficient matrix 
in K(L) without the contemporaneous coefficient matrix B, such that 
K(L) = B + K0(L)                             (3) 
Then the structural model is linked to the reduced-form model as 
Q(L) = -B-1 K0(L)                             (4) 
The structural innovations and reduced-form disturbances, and their variance-covariance 
matrices are linked as 
But = et                                    (5) 
Ω=′ΣBB                              (6) 
The identification is achieved by Cholesky decomposition of variance-covariance matrix of 
reduced-form residuals ∑ , which makes B matrix as triangular matrix.    
3.2 Data
 
The major source of data is International Financial Statistics (IFS) published by 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The study is confined only to G-7 countries (United States, 
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United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan). This confinement is relevant in 
the sense that these countries have closer economic ties, and the shocks generated in any of these 
countries have significant impact on other economies in the this group. We first analyze the co-
movement between federal funds rate and stock prices, and the source of data for this analysis is 
St. Louis Fed’s daily federal funds rate (FFR) and SP500 Index (SP500) starting from January 7, 
1957 through September 23, 2010. For all other estimations, we use quarterly data ranging from 
1993Q4 to 2010Q1. The starting point for the data was chosen as 1993Q4 because U.S. financial 
stress index, one of the major variables in the study, is available starting from this date. Next, we 
estimate the VAR model for U.S. macroeconomic variables, which includes the variables real 
GDP (RGDP), GDP deflator (DGDP), Federal Funds Rate (FFR), financial stress index (FSI), 
U.S. share price index (SP), Industrial Production Index (seasonally adjusted) (IP), Consumption 
(CONS), Investment (INV), Claims on Private Sector (CPS), and international variables such as 
Terms of Trade (TT), Foreign Exchange Reserves (FEX), Security Holdings of Non-residents 
(SEC_NR) (which is available only up to 2007Q3), and Real Effective Exchange Rates (REER). 
The international macroeconomic variables for G-7 countries include real GDP (RGDP), short-
term interest rates (R), and share price index (SPI), with corresponding country names for each 
of the variables.  The source of all these data is International Financial Statistics (IFS). For 
exchange rates, we use effective exchange rates in place of ordinary exchange rates between two 
countries. Effective exchange rates are obtained by suitably weighing the exchange rate index for 
the country itself and the index of 20 other industrial countries. The justification for using such 
rates comes from the fact that our sample includes major industrial countries and such rates truly 
reflect the exchange rate behavior among these countries.  
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The financial shock in the U.S. is measured by St. Louis Fed’s Financial Stress Index 
(FSI). This measure has been constructed by using principal components analysis, according to 
which financial stress is extracted by assuming that it is a primary factor influencing a co-
movement of a group of variables (there are 18 variables in consideration and among them are 
effective federal funds rate, Baa-rated corporate, J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index 
Plus, 3-month London Interbank Offering Rate–Overnight Index Swap Spread, Corporate Baa-
rated bond minus 10-year Treasury, Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index, 
to name a few). All these 18 variables capture some aspect of financial stress, and when the level 
of financial stress in the economy changes, these variables are likely to move together. It is 
assumed that financial stress is the most important factor in explaining the comovement of these 
18 variables. Higher values of the FSI indicate a greater degree of financial stress in the economy 
and vice versa. 
Table 1: Unit Root Test# 
U.S. Macroeconomic Variables International Macroeconomic Variables 
Var.  ADF Stat. Var.  
ADF 
Stat. Var.  
ADF 
Stat. Var.  
ADF 
Stat. Var.  
ADF 
Stat. 
RGDP -2.98 INV -3.81 RGDP_CAN -3.24 R_CAN -3.90 SP_CAN -3.14 
DGDP -3.08 CPS -2.68 RGDP_FRA -2.54 R_FRA -2.89 SP_FRA -2.34 
FFR -1.46 TT -1.51 RGDP_GER -2.73 R_GER -2.89 SP_GER -2.92 
FSI -3.67 FEX -3.03 RGDP_ITA -2.46 R_ITA -3.72 SP_ITA -2.91 
SP -2.75 SEC_NR -1.84 RGDP_JAP -3.52 R_JAP -5.29 SP_JAP -3.59 
IP -2.39 REER -3.03 RGDP_UK -3.10 R_UK -3.61 - - 
#All variables are in log difference except FFR and FSI. Short-term interest rates for rest of G-7 countries are in 
first difference. Tests were conducted in the specification with intercepts and 5 lags  
Critical values for 1%, 5%, and 10% are, respectively, -3.54, -2.91, and -2.59. 
 
 
Before estimating VAR, all these variables were tested for unit roots (results are 
reported in Table 1). Ng and Perron (1998)’s lag length test supported for 5 lags for unit root 
tests (Schwert’s criteria sets 10 as the maximum lag, and t-value for last equation in ADF test 
for 5 lags is 2.00).  
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4. Empirical Results  
4.1 Interplay between Federal Funds Rate and Stock Prices 
We start out our analysis by observing the behavior of federal funds rate and U.S. stock 
prices. The interaction between these two variables can be characterized as the first 
interrelationship that we can analyze between financial sector and the macro economy in the 
United States. The behavior is observed by estimating a VAR for the daily data starting from 
January 7, 1957 to September 23, 2010. An identification strategy to estimate the VAR is 
Cholesky decomposition, according to which we assume federal funds rate do not have 
contemporaneous effect on stock prices in one specification and other way around in another 
specification as shown below. 
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Figure 1: Interplay between Federal Funds Rates and Stock Prices 
               
The results are shown in Figure 1. Stock prices respond negatively to the monetary shock 
(that is, the shock on federal funds rate), and the effect of shocks dies out after about ten days. 
This result is consistent with the evidence that stock market responds immediately with 
decreasing stock prices when there is an announcement of raising federal funds rate by the Fed 
and an increase in stock prices with Fed’s policy announcement of lowering interest rates. The 
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second panel of the figure, however, demonstrates that the response of Fed is not definite when 
there a shock in stock prices. This is in consistent with Fed’s behavior that the Fed is reluctant to 
react stock market variations immediately but Fed adopts the policy of wait and see until the Fed 
feels that stock market vulnerability may affect its implicit inflation target (as suggested in 
Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001)). The behavior of like this has implication for the ordering of 
the variables in our extended system below, where there is a logical reason why we put stock 
market variables after federal funds rate.  
4.2 Transmission Effects to Other U.S. Macroeconomic Variables 
We now extend our analysis to observe the effects of U.S. financial shocks to U.S. 
macroeconomic variables. For the identification of financial shocks, we again adopt a recursive 
scheme as suggested by Sims (1980) and applied in Kim (2001). We apply this approach in the 
basic system first and add new variables one-by-one in the extended systems so that the impulse 
responses of the variables in the basic system does not change even in the extended system 
which validates that the financial shocks were appropriately identified.  
Basic Scheme 
The system with domestic macroeconomic variables comprises real GDP (RGDP), GDP 
deflator (DGDP), Federal Funds Rate (FFR), financial stress index (FSI) and U.S. share price 
index (SP). Two recursive frameworks are used taking account of two different financial 
variables FSI and SP, and the ordering of the variables in the basic system are (RGDP, DGDP, 
FFR, FSI) and (RGDP, DGDP, FFR, FSI, SP) as shown in the following specifications:  
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The specifications above indicate that the real sector reacts sluggishly to monetary policy 
and financial shocks (federal funds rate, financial stress index, and stock price index) (first and 
second equations). It is a customary assumption that real GDP and prices respond to monetary 
shocks with a lag (Christiano et al. (1996, 1998)). For instance, within the quarter firms do not 
change their output and prices in response to unexpected changes in monetary policy due to 
adjustment costs. The argument for the sluggish response of real sector to financial sector, on the 
other hand, comes from the fact that when the response of monetary policy to financial sector is 
not immediate (as evidenced by the analysis in the first part of this section) the real sector also 
responds sluggishly to the financial variables. This assumption is also consistent with the belief 
that monetary authority is reluctant to react financial sector developments promptly but rather 
wait for some time and appropriately respond when needed (Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001)). 
The financial variables as being an asset price or the proxy of asset prices, however, react 
immediately to changes in all the other variables in the system (third, fourth and fifth equations).  
The inclusion of financial stress index in the specification above requires more theoretical 
justification. Cecchetti et al. (2002) simulate a similar model as Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 
2001) and find that a central bank that recognizes a bubble in the dynamics of the stock market 
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should react to it. This conclusion was based on simply adding a reaction to stock prices in 
Taylor rule that helps reduce overall volatility in the economy. Bjornland and Leitemo (2009), on 
the other hand, analyze the interdependence between US monetary policy and the S&P 500 using 
structural vector autoregressive (VAR) methodology. Bjornland and Leitemo (2009) uses the 
similar short-run identification strategy as used in this study. The study found a great 
interdependence between the interest rate setting and real stock prices. Real stock prices 
immediately fall by seven to nine percent due to a monetary policy shock that raises the federal 
funds rate by 100 basis points. A stock price shock increasing real stock prices by one percent 
leads to an increase in the interest rate of close to 4 basis points. Also in support for the necessity 
of stock market behavior to be accounted for when analyzing the dynamics of aggregate 
economy, Castelnuovo E. and S. Nistico (2010), in an estimation of DSGE model, find that there 
is a significant impact of stock prices on real activity and business cycles, and their estimation 
also identify a significant and counteractive Fed response to stock-price fluctuations.   
Table 1: Results on Cross Validation 
Dependent 
Variables 
in VAR 
Root Mean Squared 
Error (RMSE) 
Mean Absolute Error 
(MAE) F-Statistics* 
Model 
with FSI 
Model 
without FSI 
Model 
with FSI 
Model 
without 
FSI 
Model 
with FSI 
Model 
without 
FSI 
RGDP 0.968 0.975 0.502 0.437 9.93 
(0.00) 
2.53       
(0.01) 
DGDP 0.855 0.852 0.302 0.306 2.23        
(0.03) 
2.43       
(0.03) 
FFR 3.521 4.018 2.643 3.559 350.88 
(0.00) 
273.35 
(0.00) 
FSI 1.427 - 1.035 - 46.51 
(0.00) 
- 
* the numbers in parentheses are p-values for F-statistics 
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To substantiate this view, we also conduct a cross-validation of our VAR estimation. For 
this analysis, we divide our entire sample into two subsamples and we choose a breaking point 
for this division as 2002Q2, which is supported by Qu and Perron (2007)’s test of structural 
changes in multivariate regressions. This breaking point deserves relevance also based on the 
fact that the famously known dot-com bubble crashed around this time leading to the financial 
crisis and then to 2001 recession. We then estimate a VAR for subsample period prior to this 
breaking point and use the estimated parameters thus obtained to forecast the variables for the 
second subsample. The assessment of forecast is judged based on the root mean squared errors 
(RMSE) and mean absolute errors (MAE). The forecast assessment as shown in Table 1 in the 
Appendix justifies for the VAR model with FSI, as RMSE and MAE are mostly smaller in this 
model than they are in the model without FSI. The results are also supported by F-test. 
Table3: Variance Decompositions with Order Change and with-and-without FSI 
Qtrs. 
Shocks 
Benchmark Model Model with Order Change of FSI and FFR Model without FSI 
RGDP DGDP FFR FSI RGDP DGDP FSI FFR RGDP DGDP FFR 
   Variance Decomposition of RGDP 
2 56.5 7.6 27.7 8.2 56.5 7.6 6.5 29.4 93.1 0.7 6.2 
5 40.2 13.7 25.4 20.7 40.2 13.7 19.2 26.9 77.5 4.4 18.1 
10 27.0 41.8 15.8 15.5 27.0 41.8 14.6 16.6 70.5 10.8 18.7 
15 28.1 40.7 15.8 15.5 28.1 40.7 14.6 16.7 71.6 10.2 18.2 
20 25.5 45.0 14.7 14.7 25.5 45.0 13.9 15.6 70.3 10.9 18.8 
   Variance Decomposition of DGDP 
2 7.0 87.9 0.0 5.1 7.0 87.9 5.1 0.0 0.4 99.5 0.0 
5 12.6 81.2 0.7 5.5 12.6 81.2 5.7 0.6 15.7 84.1 0.1 
10 13.0 75.4 3.6 8.0 13.0 75.4 8.0 3.6 19.7 74.9 5.3 
15 12.7 75.9 3.3 8.2 12.7 75.9 8.1 3.3 24.2 69.1 6.7 
20 12.6 75.5 3.6 8.4 12.6 75.5 8.3 3.6 26.5 65.4 8.1 
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In addition, the variance decomposition with different ordering of the variables and the 
models with-and-without FSI in Table 3 also justifies for the financial variable to be one of the 
variables that should be included in the VAR specification. First taking account of order change 
between FFR and FSI (which has drawn much controversy), as an example, the contribution of 
financial shocks to explain RGDP and DGDP have increased in our benchmark estimation, the 
model we have used in our estimation (compare bold-faced numbers). When comparing the 
model that includes FSI with the one that does not contain FSI, we have compared the efficacy of 
monetary policy shocks to affect RGDP and GDP and find that the model performs better with 
the model with FSI because the contribution of monetary policy shocks to affect these two 
variables has increased, at least at the beginning of the quarters, which is in line with the goal 
that central banks set in the short-run (compare italic numbers).  
Figure 2: Responses to the Shocks in Financial Stress Index (FSI) 
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Figure 3: Responses to the shocks in Stock Prices 
 
 
Figures 2 and 3 display the estimated impulse responses to an unexpected temporary 
financial stress index.  The results are consistent with the general expectation that the economy is 
negatively affected when it is hit by financial shocks. The innovation to FSI, for example, has 
contractionary effect on real GDP and the impact is immediate. The FFR, on the other hand, 
declines after the economy is hit by financial shocks, which is the same phenomenon we observe 
during and after the crisis. The prices and federal funds rate have also declined. The effects do 
not change much when there is an innovation to either financial stress index or in stock prices.  
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Responses of Other U.S. Macroeconomic Variables 
In order to observe the impulses responses of other U.S. macroeconomic variables the 
similar identification strategy is applied as above but all other U.S. macroeconomic variables are 
placed one-by-one in between DGDP and FFR as in equation (4) shown below. This 
specification assumes that other macroeconomic variables are also contemporaneously 
exogenous to monetary policy and financial shocks.  
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where, USMV stands for U.S. domestic macroeconomic variables, such as Industrial Production 
(IP), Investment (INV), Claims on Private Sector (CPS), and international variables such as 
Terms of Trade (TT), Foreign Exchange Reserves (FEX), Security Holdings of Non-residents 
(SEC_NR), and Real Effective Exchange Rates (REER).  
Figure 4 reports the impulse responses of other U.S. domestic macroeconomic variables. 
The responses are also in line with general expectation. Industrial production (IP) and Banks’ 
Asset Liability Ratio (BALR) falls on the negative territory after the financial shocks. The 
difference between asset and liabilities, which can be defined as capital requirements, on the 
other hand, also respond negatively to financial shocks, which support the evidence that banks 
face capital crisis after the negative shocks in the economy. Claims on private sector or private 
loans (CPS) and investment (INV) exhibit mixed responses over the quarters ahead following the 
shocks. 
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Figure 4: Responses of Other Macroeconomic Variables 
  
   
Figure 5: Reponses of U.S. International Macroeconomic Variables
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The financial shocks in the U.S., however, do not affect negatively for international 
macroeconomic variables of the U.S. (Figure 5). The results show that the terms of trade (TT), 
the log of ratio of export prices to import prices, has temporarily improved following the 
financial shocks. This results may be attributed to the declining imports due to reduced income in 
the U.S.. Foreign exchange reserves (FEX) and the holdings of U.S. securities by foreigners 
(SEC_NR) do not exhibit any definite pattern following the shocks. The exchange rates 
temporarily appreciates until two quarters but after that follows the similar pattern as foreign 
exchange reserves and the holdings of U.S. securities by foreigners.  
4.3 Transmission Effects to Foreign Macroeconomic Variables 
The analysis is now extended to the foreign macroeconomic variables in G-7 countries. 
Same as before, foreign macroeconomic variables take the position in between DGDP and FFR 
in the VAR specification as in equation (5). 
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where FMV stands for Real GDP (RGDP), Short-term Interest Rates (R), and Share Prices (SP) 
for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and UK.  
Figure 6 shows the responses of real GDP, interest rates, and share prices after the financial 
crisis in the U.S.. The real GDP in the rest of G-7 countries decline immediately when financial 
crisis hits the U.S. economy. The decline in real GDP, however, does not last for a long period of 
time.  
56 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Responses of G-7 Macroeconomic Variables 
(i) RGDP 
 
 (ii) Interest Rates  
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Figure 6 - Continued 
(iii) Share Prices 
 
 
The interest rates persistently decline following the financial shocks in the U.S. The decline 
in interest rates is consistent with the belief that the central banks in other countries pursue the 
same U.S. policy of reducing interest rates as a cushion to defend their economies from adverse 
effects that may come from exchange rates appreciation. 
Share prices also follow the similar trend as interest rates when there is an financial stress 
in the U.S.. The G-7 countries are financially most integrated, it is therefore customary to believe 
that share markets move in the same directions in these countries when one country is hit by 
financial crisis.  
The variance decompositions in Table 4 demonstrate the proportion of movement of the 
variables included in the VAR specification in the basic system as resulted from different shocks. 
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Table 4: Variance Decompositions – Basic System 
 
Qtrs. RGDP DGDP 
RGDP DGDP FFR FSI RGDP DGDP FFR FSI 
1 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 97.1 0.0 0.0 
2 46.0 6.3 29.2 18.5 4.4 92.8 0.0 2.8 
3 40.0 7.5 27.9 24.6 4.5 92.7 0.0 2.8 
4 33.1 6.3 24.7 35.9 4.4 91.2 1.1 3.3 
5 32.5 7.7 24.5 35.3 4.3 90.2 2.1 3.3 
6 32.4 7.7 24.6 35.3 4.3 89.9 2.3 3.4 
7 27.5 21.3 20.8 30.4 4.3 89.5 2.5 3.6 
8 27.3 21.1 20.8 30.8 4.3 89.3 2.6 3.8 
9 27.1 21.3 21.0 30.6 4.3 89.2 2.7 3.8 
10 27.1 21.2 21.0 30.7 4.4 89.2 2.7 3.8 
11 27.1 21.3 21.0 30.6 4.4 89.1 2.7 3.8 
12 27.0 21.3 21.2 30.5 4.4 89.1 2.7 3.8 
13 26.8 21.7 21.3 30.3 4.4 89.1 2.7 3.8 
14 26.6 21.9 21.4 30.1 4.4 89.1 2.7 3.8 
15 26.4 22.1 21.6 29.9 4.4 89.1 2.7 3.8 
16 26.1 22.5 21.8 29.6 4.4 89.1 2.7 3.8 
17 25.9 22.9 22.0 29.3 4.4 89.1 2.7 3.8 
18 25.7 23.2 22.2 29.0 4.4 89.0 2.7 3.8 
19 25.5 23.4 22.4 28.7 4.4 89.0 2.8 3.8 
20 25.3 23.6 22.5 28.5 4.4 89.0 2.8 3.8 
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Table 4 - Continued 
FFR FSI 
RGDP DGDP FFR FSI RGDP DGDP FFR FSI 
2.0 2.0 96.0 0.0 8.5 4.4 0.5 86.7 
0.6 20.0 75.3 4.1 10.2 12.4 0.2 77.1 
1.0 31.3 63.8 3.9 10.7 14.1 1.3 74.0 
1.7 32.5 62.4 3.3 8.2 32.4 2.7 56.7 
2.3 36.7 58.2 2.7 5.9 47.7 3.6 42.8 
2.6 39.6 55.4 2.4 5.0 52.8 4.0 38.2 
2.9 41.5 53.4 2.2 4.8 54.1 4.5 36.6 
3.2 42.7 52.1 2.0 4.7 54.5 5.1 35.7 
3.3 43.6 51.3 1.8 4.6 54.8 5.5 35.1 
3.5 44.3 50.6 1.7 4.6 54.8 5.6 35.0 
3.6 44.7 50.1 1.5 4.6 54.7 5.6 35.1 
3.7 45.0 49.9 1.4 4.5 54.6 5.6 35.2 
3.8 45.2 49.7 1.4 4.5 54.6 5.6 35.2 
3.8 45.3 49.6 1.3 4.5 54.7 5.7 35.1 
3.9 45.4 49.5 1.3 4.4 54.8 5.9 34.9 
3.9 45.4 49.5 1.2 4.4 54.8 6.1 34.6 
4.0 45.4 49.4 1.2 4.4 54.9 6.3 34.4 
4.0 45.4 49.4 1.2 4.4 54.9 6.5 34.2 
4.1 45.4 49.4 1.1 4.4 54.9 6.7 34.1 
4.1 45.4 49.4 1.1 4.4 54.9 6.8 33.9 
 
The results show that the movement of U.S. real GDP is significantly governed by financial 
shocks, which ranges from 18.5 to 28.5 percent up to twenty quarters. The financial shocks, 
however, do not cause significant variations in inflation and federal funds rate. The contribution 
of financial shocks for the variation of inflation remains at around 3 percent for entire twenty 
quarters, whereas it is 1 to 4 percent variation in federal funds rate during this period. The 
smaller contribution for the variance of federal funds rate is consistent with what has been 
observed in our analysis at the beginning for the interplay between federal funds rate and stock 
prices where the shocks on stock prices do not have any definite effect on federal funds rate. 
 
60 
 
 
 
Table 5: Variance Decompositions - U.S. Other Macroeconomic Variables 
 
Qtrs. IP BLAR 
RGDP DGDP IP FFR FSI RGDP DGDP BLAR FFR FSI 
1 1.7 62.8 35.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 20.4 79.5 0.0 0.0 
2 15.5 41.1 25.5 0.4 17.5 0.6 23.0 76.4 0.0 0.0 
3 21.4 36.1 19.7 0.3 22.5 2.5 24.9 72.2 0.3 0.1 
4 20.8 38.9 19.9 0.9 19.5 2.7 23.5 73.4 0.3 0.1 
5 18.3 46.0 17.2 1.6 16.9 2.7 21.2 75.0 0.5 0.6 
6 16.0 52.4 15.1 1.5 14.9 2.4 19.5 76.3 0.6 1.1 
7 15.9 52.9 15.1 1.4 14.8 2.4 18.3 76.8 0.5 2.0 
8 15.8 52.7 15.0 1.4 15.1 2.4 16.6 77.7 0.4 2.8 
9 15.7 52.2 15.1 1.6 15.5 2.4 15.1 78.5 0.4 3.6 
10 15.7 51.9 15.2 1.7 15.6 2.3 13.8 79.3 0.4 4.2 
11 15.7 51.7 15.1 1.7 15.7 2.2 12.7 79.9 0.4 4.7 
12 15.7 51.6 15.0 1.7 15.9 2.1 11.9 80.2 0.4 5.2 
13 15.7 51.6 15.0 1.7 16.0 2.1 11.3 80.5 0.4 5.7 
14 15.6 51.6 15.0 1.7 16.0 2.1 10.8 80.6 0.4 6.1 
15 15.6 51.6 15.0 1.7 16.0 2.1 10.5 80.6 0.4 6.5 
16 15.6 51.7 15.0 1.7 16.0 2.0 10.2 80.5 0.4 6.9 
17 15.6 51.7 15.0 1.7 16.0 2.0 9.9 80.4 0.5 7.2 
18 15.6 51.7 15.0 1.8 16.0 2.0 9.7 80.3 0.5 7.5 
19 15.6 51.7 15.0 1.8 16.0 2.0 9.6 80.2 0.6 7.7 
20 15.6 51.6 14.9 1.8 16.0 1.9 9.4 80.0 0.8 7.8 
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Table 5 – Continued 
CPS INV 
RGDP DGDP CPS FFR FSI RGDP DGDP INV FFR FSI 
18.5 0.6 80.9 0.0 0.0 15.6 5.8 78.7 0.0 0.0 
15.9 2.5 75.8 4.4 1.3 13.3 15.7 69.2 1.3 0.4 
14.4 15.7 65.0 3.8 1.1 11.1 17.7 61.5 4.0 5.7 
18.1 17.8 58.4 4.8 1.0 11.1 17.9 61.4 4.0 5.7 
17.2 17.6 54.4 9.0 1.8 10.9 17.4 59.7 4.0 7.9 
16.9 19.9 50.6 9.0 3.6 13.6 17.1 56.8 3.9 8.6 
15.3 20.4 48.1 11.0 5.2 13.5 17.1 56.8 3.9 8.7 
14.6 22.4 46.1 11.6 5.3 13.7 17.0 56.6 4.0 8.7 
14.6 22.2 46.2 11.6 5.4 14.3 16.9 56.2 4.0 8.7 
14.7 21.7 45.9 11.8 5.9 14.6 16.8 55.8 4.0 8.7 
14.6 21.3 45.9 12.1 6.1 14.6 16.7 55.8 4.0 8.8 
14.8 21.2 45.6 12.3 6.1 14.6 16.8 55.7 4.0 8.8 
14.9 21.1 45.3 12.7 6.0 14.8 16.7 55.6 4.0 8.8 
15.1 21.0 45.0 13.0 6.0 14.9 16.7 55.5 4.0 8.9 
15.1 21.0 44.6 13.4 5.9 14.9 16.7 55.5 4.1 8.9 
15.0 21.2 44.1 13.8 5.9 14.9 16.7 55.5 4.1 8.9 
14.9 21.5 43.6 14.2 5.8 14.9 16.7 55.5 4.1 8.9 
14.8 21.6 43.2 14.6 5.8 14.9 16.7 55.5 4.1 8.9 
14.8 21.8 42.8 15.0 5.7 15.0 16.7 55.4 4.1 8.9 
14.7 22.0 42.4 15.3 5.6 15.0 16.7 55.4 4.1 8.9 
 
As demonstrated in Table 5 for other U.S. macroeconomic variables, industrial production 
shares significant proportions of variations resulting from financial shocks, which is around 16 
percent for most of the quarters and second after price shocks. Financial shocks have contributed 
moderately for the variations in banks’ capital position and in private loans.  The movement in 
investment attributed to financial shocks is nearly one-tenth among the contributions of other 
shocks. 
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Table 6: Variance Decompositions - U.S. International Variables 
 
Qtrs. TT REER 
RGDP DGDP TT FFR FSI RGDP DGDP REER FFR FSI 
1 0.4 7.9 91.7 0.0 0.0 0.6 7.1 92.3 0.0 0.0 
2 4.2 3.9 88.2 0.9 2.9 0.7 31.9 67.1 0.2 0.1 
3 13.2 9.1 70.6 3.5 3.6 1.4 29.8 64.6 0.6 3.7 
4 20.0 11.6 58.3 7.3 2.8 1.7 31.7 62.4 0.6 3.5 
5 24.0 10.3 53.1 10.0 2.6 1.9 31.6 59.5 0.7 6.4 
6 25.7 12.0 49.0 10.9 2.4 2.4 31.5 58.7 1.0 6.4 
7 27.4 12.1 46.8 11.1 2.6 2.4 31.6 58.6 1.0 6.4 
8 28.8 11.8 45.6 11.0 2.8 2.4 32.6 56.9 1.0 7.1 
9 29.6 11.5 45.0 10.9 2.9 2.3 32.6 56.3 1.1 7.7 
10 30.1 11.5 44.5 10.9 3.0 2.3 32.6 56.2 1.1 7.8 
11 30.5 11.5 44.2 10.8 3.1 2.3 33.1 55.7 1.1 7.7 
12 30.8 11.4 44.0 10.7 3.1 2.3 33.9 54.9 1.2 7.7 
13 31.0 11.3 44.0 10.6 3.1 2.3 34.2 54.6 1.3 7.7 
14 31.1 11.3 44.0 10.6 3.1 2.3 34.2 54.4 1.4 7.7 
15 31.2 11.2 44.0 10.5 3.1 2.3 34.4 54.2 1.5 7.7 
16 31.2 11.2 44.0 10.5 3.1 2.3 34.5 54.0 1.6 7.7 
17 31.2 11.3 43.9 10.5 3.0 2.3 34.5 53.9 1.6 7.7 
18 31.2 11.3 43.9 10.6 3.0 2.3 34.5 53.9 1.7 7.7 
19 31.1 11.4 43.8 10.6 3.0 2.3 34.4 53.9 1.7 7.7 
20 31.0 11.5 43.8 10.7 3.0 2.3 34.4 53.9 1.7 7.7 
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Table 6 – Continued 
FXRES SEC_NONRES 
RGDP DGDP FXRES FFR FSI RGDP DGDP SEC_NONRES FFR FSI 
0.1 0.9 99.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.9 97.5 0.0 0.0 
0.4 6.7 89.4 3.5 0.0 12.4 1.6 85.1 0.2 0.7 
0.3 8.1 87.3 3.5 0.9 13.4 5.2 80.5 0.3 0.6 
0.8 9.9 83.5 3.4 2.5 14.4 7.5 75.4 0.7 2.0 
0.9 12.1 81.2 3.4 2.4 12.5 6.6 76.1 2.0 2.8 
0.9 13.0 80.3 3.4 2.5 13.3 6.4 73.7 2.2 4.5 
0.9 13.9 79.4 3.4 2.4 12.8 8.2 72.5 2.1 4.3 
0.9 14.0 79.2 3.4 2.5 14.2 8.5 71.0 2.2 4.2 
0.9 14.1 79.2 3.4 2.5 14.0 8.3 70.3 2.4 5.0 
0.9 14.1 79.1 3.4 2.5 13.9 8.3 69.8 2.4 5.7 
0.9 14.1 79.1 3.4 2.5 14.0 8.6 69.4 2.4 5.6 
0.9 14.2 79.0 3.4 2.5 14.4 8.6 68.9 2.4 5.7 
0.9 14.2 79.0 3.4 2.5 14.4 8.5 68.5 2.4 6.1 
0.9 14.2 79.0 3.4 2.5 14.4 8.5 68.3 2.4 6.3 
0.9 14.2 79.0 3.4 2.5 14.5 8.5 68.1 2.5 6.3 
0.9 14.2 79.0 3.4 2.5 14.6 8.5 67.9 2.5 6.4 
0.9 14.2 79.0 3.4 2.5 14.6 8.5 67.8 2.6 6.6 
0.9 14.2 79.0 3.4 2.5 14.6 8.5 67.7 2.6 6.6 
0.9 14.2 79.0 3.4 2.5 14.7 8.5 67.6 2.7 6.6 
0.9 14.2 79.0 3.4 2.5 14.7 8.5 67.5 2.7 6.6 
 
Table 6 shows the variance decomposition for U.S. international macroeconomic 
variables. The contribution of financial shocks to cause variation in international macroeconomic 
variables is trivial, which is no more that 10 percent for all variables under analysis. The 
variation in terms of trade, for example, is only 3 percent, whereas it is 8 percent for real 
exchange rates owing to financial shocks. The other domestic shocks govern a significant 
proportion of variations in international variables. Thirty one percent variation in terms of trade 
is attributed to the shocks in real GDP and price shocks contributes as much for the variation in 
exchange rates at the end of twentieth quarter.  
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In Tables 7 – 9, we report variance decompositions for international macroeconomic 
variables for G-7 countries. The numbers in the tables are the proportions of variations on the 
variables under analysis resulting from only financial shocks, thus one should not be confused 
that the numbers do not add up to 100 percent for each quarter.  
Table 7: Variance Decompositions - G-7 Real GDP (Shocks to U.S. FSI) 
Qtrs. RGDP_CAN RGDP_FRA RGDP_GER RGDP_ITA RGDP_JAP RGDP_UK 
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2 11.3 4.8 4.6 1.4 0.0 19.4 
3 12.0 5.0 5.1 1.2 0.0 18.7 
4 14.8 6.1 6.3 1.2 0.6 18.6 
5 14.2 6.1 6.3 1.7 0.5 18.2 
6 13.8 6.4 6.7 2.5 0.5 18.5 
7 13.7 6.2 6.5 2.7 0.5 17.7 
8 14.5 6.2 6.6 4.3 0.5 17.8 
9 14.7 6.2 6.5 5.7 0.5 17.6 
10 14.7 6.2 6.5 5.6 0.5 17.5 
11 14.7 6.2 6.5 5.7 0.6 17.6 
12 14.7 6.2 6.5 6.7 0.6 17.5 
13 14.7 6.2 6.5 7.1 0.6 17.5 
14 14.7 6.2 6.5 7.2 0.6 17.5 
15 14.7 6.2 6.5 8.2 0.6 17.5 
16 14.7 6.2 6.5 8.8 0.6 17.5 
17 14.7 6.2 6.5 9.4 0.6 17.5 
18 14.7 6.2 6.5 10.0 0.6 17.5 
19 14.7 6.2 6.5 10.1 0.6 17.5 
20 14.6 6.2 6.5 10.1 0.6 17.5 
 
Table 7 demonstrates that financial shock in the U.S. has some role for the variation in real 
GDP of rest of G-7 countries. Nearly ten to fifteen percent variation in real GDP in Canada, for 
example, is dictated by the financial shocks in the U.S.. Also, nearly as much variation in real 
GDP in the U.K. is governed by the same U.S. financial shocks. The effect on rest of other 
countries’ real GDP is moderate.  
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Table 8: Variance Decompositions - G-7 Interest Rates (Shocks to U.S. FSI) 
Qtrs. R_CAN R_FRA R_GER R_ITA R_JAP R_UK 
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2 1.7 0.0 17.0 17.1 1.7 22.0 
3 2.2 5.7 23.3 25.9 2.2 30.5 
4 2.2 7.7 22.0 25.2 2.2 27.4 
5 2.1 7.6 19.0 24.2 2.2 23.4 
6 1.9 7.1 16.0 21.4 2.4 20.3 
7 1.9 7.3 15.7 21.1 2.4 20.0 
8 1.9 7.8 15.3 20.9 2.4 20.0 
9 1.9 7.8 15.0 20.8 2.4 20.0 
10 1.9 7.8 14.7 20.7 2.4 19.9 
11 1.9 7.7 14.6 20.6 2.4 19.9 
12 1.9 7.8 14.6 20.6 2.4 19.9 
13 1.9 7.9 14.5 20.4 2.4 19.9 
14 1.9 7.9 14.5 20.3 2.4 19.8 
15 1.9 8.0 14.4 20.1 2.4 19.7 
16 1.9 8.0 14.3 19.9 2.4 19.7 
17 1.9 8.0 14.3 19.8 2.4 19.6 
18 1.9 7.9 14.2 19.6 2.4 19.5 
19 1.9 7.9 14.1 19.5 2.4 19.4 
20 1.9 7.8 14.1 19.4 2.4 19.4 
 
Financial shocks in the U.S. are also a significant factor to govern nominal short-term 
interest rates in G-7 countries. The U.K. demonstrates the similar trend as with real GDP for the 
interest as well, where nearly 20 percent variation comes from financial shocks in the U.S.. 
Interest rates in Japan is less responsive to the financial shocks in the U.S., potentially for the 
reason that the interest rates in Japan are at very low levels compared to other countries during 
the sample period and there is no room for it to move even though U.S. financial shocks put 
pressure on it.  
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Table 9: Variance Decompositions - G-7 Share Prices (Shocks to U.S. FSI) 
Qtrs. SP_CAN SP_FRA SP_GER SP_ITA SP_JAP 
1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2 8.4 4.7 1.1 4.2 8.0 
3 8.1 4.5 1.3 5.9 8.4 
4 9.8 5.6 2.5 6.0 10.2 
5 8.9 5.1 2.4 5.4 9.2 
6 9.2 5.3 2.7 4.9 10.1 
7 9.0 5.4 2.9 4.9 10.0 
8 9.1 5.4 2.9 5.0 10.0 
9 9.0 5.3 2.9 5.0 9.9 
10 9.0 5.3 3.0 5.1 9.9 
11 9.0 5.3 3.0 5.1 9.9 
12 9.0 5.3 3.0 5.1 9.9 
13 9.0 5.3 3.0 5.2 9.9 
14 9.0 5.3 3.0 5.2 9.9 
15 9.0 5.3 3.0 5.2 9.9 
16 9.0 5.3 3.0 5.2 9.9 
17 9.0 5.3 3.0 5.2 9.9 
18 9.0 5.3 3.0 5.2 9.9 
19 9.0 5.3 3.0 5.2 9.9 
20 9.0 5.3 3.0 5.2 9.9 
 
For share prices, Canada and Japan dominate other countries in responding to financial 
shocks in the U.S.. Nearly ten percent variations in the share prices of these countries are 
governed by U.S. financial shocks. The variations in share prices in Italy and France amount 
only about 5 percent where it is only 3 percent in Germany that results from financial shocks in 
the U.S..  
5. Conclusion 
In view of the fact that the financial crisis originated in the U.S. recently led to a global 
catastrophe, the study on transmission effects of this crisis worldwide has now been on the center 
of investigation.  With an objective to provide a complementary analysis to the existing 
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literatures, this study estimates a VAR model to identify the financial shocks in the U.S. and 
observe their effects on U.S. and international macroeconomic variables. As a starting point, we 
analyze the interaction between Federal Reserve’s monetary policy-making and the development 
in the U.S. financial sector by estimating a two variable VAR for federal funds rate and U.S. 
stock prices for daily data starting from 1957.  The benchmark results show that the financial 
shocks in the U.S. stock market does not exhibit any definite effect on the behavior of federal 
funds rate, but the effect of monetary policy shocks exerts a negative effect on stock prices. 
Other U.S. macroeconomic variables also exhibit expected responses following the shocks in the 
U.S. financial system. The positive innovation to U.S. financial stress index (FSI), for example, 
has negative impact on U.S. real GDP and industrial production. The U.S. international variables 
also also negatively after the financial shocks in the U.S.. The international transmission effect of 
U.S. financial shocks is also in line with the expectation, leading to a decline in the real GDP in 
the rest of G-7 countries following a financial stress in the U.S. This shock also leads to a decline 
in the interest rates in all other countries, and the stock market in other countries also move in 
tandem with U.S. market following the shock. 
Since this study is a preliminary attempt to identify the U.S. financial shocks and their 
transmission effects on the dynamics of domestic and international macroeconomic variables, the 
study is not far from criticism. One of the major issues that should be taken account of is the 
degree of exogeneity between monetary policy and stock market behavior. There is a great deal 
of debate among economists regarding whether stock market behavior should be included in 
monetary policy rule or not, and there is no complete agreement available as of now. In this 
study also, for example, if the ordering of the variables is changed such that financial variables 
(FSI and SP) come before FFR, making financial variables more exogenous to FFR, the results 
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show that the response of RGDP do not change following the shocks on FFR (monetary policy 
shocks) but the FSI responded positively, as opposed to negative response of FFR to the financial 
shocks. This result indicates that more works need to be done to resolve the issue of exogeneity 
between monetary policy and financial sector to capture the better transmission mechanism that 
relates financial sector and macro economy.  
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CHAPTER 4 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this dissertation is to study the effects of U.S. real, nominal shocks, and 
financial shocks on key macroeconomic variables in G-7 countries. We estimate VAR models 
and the results are found to be consistent with the predictions of standard macroeconomic 
models. The impulse responses of U.S. real GDP relative to the rest of other countries to the 
supply shocks, for example, results in a rise in U.S.’s real GDP compared to other countries’ 
following the supply shocks in the U.S.. There is persistence in relative real GDP after the supply 
shocks whereas it exhibits hump-shape in response to nominal shocks such as demand and 
monetary shocks. 
The real effective exchange rates also demonstrate the consistent behavior following the 
supply shocks. The relative real effective exchange rates depreciate in all G-7 country pairs when 
there is a positive supply shock in the U.S.. The effect of monetary shocks to the real exchange 
rates also matches the model’s prediction in most of the country pairs resulting in real 
depreciation of home currency in response to the monetary shocks in the U.S.. As contrary to the 
model’s prediction, the exchange rates, however, do not appreciate when U.S. economy is hit by 
demand shocks. The effect of monetary shocks are consistent with the model for all country pairs 
resulting in a rise in the U.S.’s relative prices in response to monetary shocks in the U.S.. The 
behavior of prices after the supply shocks is not as expected. The expected negative effect of 
supply shocks to relative prices as predicted by the model is observed only for U.S./Canada pair.  
The analysis of variance decompositions confirm that that the movement in relative real 
GDP for all country pairs is mainly attributed to the supply shocks. The movement in real 
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effective exchange rates, on the other hand, is mainly governed by demand shocks, whereas 
monetary shocks are dominant to explain relative price movement.  
After the sign restrictions, the gap in growth rate differential in real GDP between the U.S. 
and other countries narrows down following a supply shocks in the U.S., but following the 
demand and monetary shocks the growth rate of real GDP in the U.S. economy is higher than the 
growth rate of real GDP in the rest of the countries.  For the differential in inflation rates, the 
domestic inflation falls shorter than the foreign inflation after supply shocks in the U.S., and the 
opposite happens when demand and monetary shocks hit the U.S. economy. The exchange rates 
demonstrate a noteworthy behavior following the supply shocks, resulting in most of the country 
pairs a smaller appreciation rate in the U.S. than the appreciation rate in the foreign economy at 
the beginning and this effect dyes out after few quarters. This suggest that not only monetary and 
demand shocks cause exchange rate overshooting but supply shocks are also attributable for 
exchange rate overshooting.  
We also estimate a VAR to identify U.S. financial shocks and observe their effects on key 
U.S. and international macroeconomic variables. The interaction between Federal Reserve’s 
monetary policy-making and the development in the U.S. financial sector is analyzed at the 
beginning by estimating a two variable VAR for federal funds rate and U.S. stock prices for daily 
data starting from 1957.  In consistent with the behavior of Federal Reserve in responding stock 
market, the results show that the financial shocks in the U.S. stock market does not cause any 
definite effect on the behavior of federal funds rate. The effect of monetary policy shocks, 
however, exerts a negative effect on stock prices.  
All other U.S. macroeconomic variables also exhibit expected responses following the 
shocks in the U.S. financial system. The U.S. real GDP and industrial production, for example, 
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are negatively affected by a positive innovation to U.S. financial stress index (FSI). The banks’ 
capital position deteriorates following the shocks. Private loans and investment demonstrate 
mixed effects. The international transmission effect of U.S. financial shocks to G-7 countries are 
also in line with the expectation, resulting in a decline in the real GDP in the rest of G-7 
countries following a financial stress in the U.S.. Foreign interest rates and stock prices both 
decline when U.S. experiences financial shocks. All these effects indicate that the 
macroeconomic variables in G-7 countries move in tandem with each other when the U.S. 
undergoes a financial shock. 
Since this study is a preliminary investigation to identify the U.S. real, nominal, and 
financial shocks and their transmission effects on the dynamics of domestic and international 
macroeconomic variables, the study is not far from criticism. The effects of U.S. shocks on 
international macroeconomic variables through terms trade and interest rate differentials have 
been ignored in this study but by addressing this issue, a realistic transmission mechanism of the 
effects of shocks from one country to other countries is expected. In analyzing the effects of 
financial shocks on real sector, one of the major issues that should be taken account of is the 
degree of exogeneity between monetary policy and stock market behavior. There is a great deal 
of debate among economists regarding whether stock market indicator should be included in 
monetary policy rule or not, and a complete agreement is still far-fetched. In this study also, for 
example, if the ordering of the variables is changed such that financial variable (FSI) are placed 
before FFR, that is, making financial variables more exogenous to FFR, the results show that 
even though the response of RGDP do not alter that much following the shocks on FFR 
(monetary policy shocks) but the response of FSI changes and it is now positive as opposed to 
negative response of FFR to the financial shocks before. This result indicates that more works 
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need to be done to resolve the issue of exogeneity between monetary policy and financial sector 
to capture the better transmission mechanism.  
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This dissertation identifies real, nominal, and financial shocks in the U.S. and observes 
their effects on U.S. as well as G-7 macroeconomic variables. First, the real and nominal shocks 
in the U.S. are identified by using long-run implications of an open economy stochastic 
macroeconomic model, and the effects of these shocks are observed in real GDP, real effective 
exchange rates, and the prices for the U.S. relative to each of six other G-7 countries. While 
Blanchard and Quah’s long-run identification strategy is used to identify the shocks, short-run 
implication of the model are also exploited, as a prima facie evidence, by applying appropriate 
sign restrictions in the contemporaneous coefficient matrix in the VAR estimation. Consistent 
with the model’s predictions, a positive supply shock results in an increase in relative U.S. real 
GDP and a real depreciation of U.S. currency whereas nominal shocks in the U.S. lead to an 
increase in relative U.S. real GDP and relative U.S. prices. The application of short-run 
dynamics with proper sign restrictions produces exchange rate overshooting following the U.S. 
real shocks. Second, A VAR is estimated to provide empirical evidence on the international 
transmission of U.S. financial shocks on the U.S. as well as on the rest of G-7 macroeconomic 
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variables. A shock to the U.S. financial sector causes a negative and immediate impact on U.S. 
real GDP and industrial production. Banks’ capital position deteriorates immediately whereas 
exchange rates and foreign exchange reserves situations worsen after few quarters of shocks 
hitting the U.S. economy. The international transmission effects demonstrate that transmits a 
negative effect on real GDP and stock prices in the rest of G-7 countries. The U.S. shocks also 
lead to a decline in the interest rates in all other countries, showing that other countries follow 
the U.S. policy of reducing interest rates after a trigger of the crisis in the U.S.. 
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